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Despite a vast accumulation of private capital, China is not embracing capitalism. Deceptively familiar
capitalist features disguise the profoundly unfamiliar foundations of “market socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by controlling the career advancement of all
senior personnel in all regulatory agencies, all state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and virtually all major
financial institutions state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and senior Party positions in all but the smallest
non-SOE enterprises, retains sole possession of Lenin’s Commanding Heights. This manuscript introduces
the chapters comprising the NBER volume Capitalizing China (Fan and Morck, eds. 2012), which
examine China’s high savings rate, banking system, financial markets, financial regulations, corporate
governance, and public finances; and consider policy alternatives the CCP might consider if its goal
is China’s elevation into the ranks of high income countries.
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1.   Introduction 
Capitalizing China (Fan and Morck, eds. 2012) examines the accumulation, distribution, and 
governance of capital in China. According to Vladimir Lenin (Yergin & Stanislaw 1998), 
capitalists control “the commanding heights” of a capitalist economy and the Communist Party 
must control the “commanding heights” of a socialist economy. In the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Party ceded this ground to capitalists – though 
sometimes the same people continued in residence there.  
  China often seems to be embracing capitalism, but unwilling to admit this. Recent 
estimates correctly attribute 70% of GDP to its private sector (Nee and Opper 2011), and 
millions of entrepreneurs are starting new businesses (Khanna 2008). But many of those 
entrepreneurs rely critically on local or central Party connections, and terms like hybrid sector or 
non-state-owned enterprise sector might more aptly describe all but the smallest of these 
enterprises, whose CEOs and boards benefit from the advice of their dedicated enterprise-level 
Party Secretaries and Party Committees.  
The studies in this volume reveal that China is not copying free market institutions, but 
trying something substantially different: Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is a 
genuinely unique system.
 1 A host of its formal reforms emulate the institutional forms of a 
market economy, often in painstaking detail. But its heart remains resolutely socialist: 
strategically placed SOEs, SOE-controlled pyramidal business groups, and ubiquitous Party 
cells, Party Secretaries, and Party Committees leave Lenin’s “commanding heights” firmly and 
exclusively under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and consign much of the 
rest to provincial and local Party cadres. This system also retains unique Chinese characteristics, 
relying on China’s ancient tradition – at least in historical eras of relatively good government – 
of an insuperable, but meaningfully meritocratic and internally competitive, Imperial Civil 
Service to gather and process information, and to manage the economy. The result is a to-date 
successful stir-fry of markets, socialism, and traditional China that is fully none of the three, but 
mixes in bits and pieces of each – all tossed together over very high heat.  
The chapters in this volume analyze this recipe in detail. Some of the ingredients the 
chapters highlight appeal to Western tastes. These include a commercial banking system replete 
with multiple regulators, inspectors, capital requirements, and disclosure rules, augmented by all 
the finery of a G7 financial regulatory system. Other ingredients less palatable to Western tastes 
include the CCP Organization Department (CCP OD) managing all senior promotions 
throughout all major banks, regulators, government ministries and agencies, SOEs, and even 
many officially-designated non-SOE enterprises. The Party promotes people through banks, 
regulatory agencies, enterprises, governments, and Party organs, handling much of the national 
economy in one huge human resources management chart. An ambitious young cadre might 
begin in a government ministry, join middle management in an SOE bank, accept a senior Party 
position in a listed enterprise, accept promotion into a top regulatory position, accept 
                                                            
1 In this chapter, we follow the government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in 
using the terms “market socialism with Chinese characteristics”, or more briefly, “market socialism” or “socialist 
market economy” to describe the economic system used in China from the early 1980s on. We recognize that the 
appropriateness of both “market” and “socialism” as attributes of this system does not accord with some scholars’ 
usage of these terms in economics, finance, and political economy. Nonetheless, these are the English words chosen 
by state and Party officials, and presumably reflect the intentions of the system’s architects – Deng Xiaoping and his 
successors. Moreover, the words are defensible, in that the Chinese economy genuinely combines a powerful 
command and control apparatus with an admixture of market forces.  2 
 
appointment as a mayor or provincial governor, become CEO of a different SOE bank, and 
perhaps ultimately rise into upper echelons of the central government or CCP (Macgregor 2010) 
– all by the grace of the CCP OD. The chapters in this volume describe state-of-the-art financial 
regulations, corporate governance codes, bankruptcy laws, taxation, and accounting and 
disclosure rules. But they also raise scores of concerns about market socialism’s basic socialist 
and Chinese ingredients leaving market economy reforms as little more than a garnish.  
So far, China’s fusion economy is an unquestionable success. In 1978, The People’s 
Republic of China posted a per capita GDP of US$155, a sparse and dangerously dilapidated 
network of narrow roads; infrequent, unreliable and dangerous air connections between small, 
decaying airports; essentially no real healthcare system; mouldering universities, and a dispirited 
cynical populace. In 2009, People’s China boasts a per capita GDP of US$2,200 – over 
US$3,700 at purchasing power parity (PPP), perhaps more given some estimates of black and 
grey market income (Wang & Woo 2011), a rapidly expanding network of divided highways, 
modern commercial airline service between sleek new airport terminals, an expanding modern 
healthcare system, and even the world’s only magnetic levitation train - connecting Shanghai to 
its airport. Maddison and Wu (2008) estimate China’s GDP surpassing Americas in 2015.  
But this divides across some 1.3 billion people, so China’s per capita GDP remains far 
below typical OECD levels, and unlikely to catch up for many years yet. For example, Japan’s 
2009 per capita GDP, at PPP comparably measured, was just under US$40,000; and America’s 
was approximately US$46,000. Market socialism with Chinese characteristics has delivered on 
early-stage industrialization and modernization; and this may well suffice to make China the 
largest economy in the world. After all, with some four times the population of the United States, 
China can attain that status by exceeding one fourth of America’s per capita. But this would still 
leave China numbered among low to middle-income countries. Propelling China’s rise into the 
ranks of high-income economies will demand far more of its institutions.  
The chapters in this volume collectively address how China’s unique market socialist 
institutions are designed, how they facilitate the accumulation and allocation of capital, how they 
contribute to economic growth, and how they are beginning to have some interesting and 
potentially problematic side effects. Each of the subsequent chapters deals with these issues from 
a different angle. Pistor (2012, this volume) examines the governance of China’s banking 
system. Allen et al. chronicle the development of the financial system. Allen and Shen (2012, 
this volume) focus on the workings of China’s securities markets. Piotroski and Wong (2012, 
this volume) explore the financial transparency of China’s business enterprises. Young et al. 
(2012, this volume) examine China’s remarkable savings rate, and Bayoumi et al. (2012, this 
volume) examine savings by China’s listed business enterprises. Gordon and Li (2012, this 
volume) examine the finances of China’s multiple levels of government, and Chen (2012, this 
volume) recounts the history of China’s rulers’ attitudes towards public finance. China’s public 
sector and the private sector are not clearly separable, but blend imperceptibly into each other.  
The remained of this chapter connects the dots to show how, while each chapter 
addresses these questions from a different perspective, their findings are profoundly 
interconnected, and in ways foreigners, especially those well-schooled in modern economics, 
often have considerable difficulty grasping. Charting these connections requires placing the 
various chapters in the context of broader research on China, especially recent research into 
public and private sector governance. Once these interconnections become clear, the chapters 
coalesce into a comprehensive picture of the uniquely Chinese institutions that characterize its 3 
 
market socialism, and present a fascinating picture of the inner workings of the world’s soon-to-
be largest economy.  
  
2.   Market Socialism’s Achievements and Potential 
Continued economic growth under Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is clearly 
important not only to China, but to the world. If the Chinese achieved the per capita GDP South 
Koreans currently enjoy, just over US$17,000, its 1.33 billion people would produce a total GDP 
of almost US$23 trillion – far more than the current $14 trillion total GDP of the United States. 
Were the Chinese to match Japan’s US$40,000 per capita GDP, China’s total GDP would 
amount to some US$53 trillion – almost four times that of the United States.  
China’s per capita GDP now is roughly where South Korea’s was thirty years ago, when 
China began its market socialism experiment in 1978; so using the South Korean per capita GDP 
to estimate China’s in 2040 is not unreasonable as a first pass. Such simple arithmetic can be 
illustrative, but hardly definitive. That an industrialized and fully developed China’s GDP will 
level off at precisely that of South Korea, Japan, or America is highly unlikely. America’s GDPs 
will continue to grow; shifting age dependency ratios will come into play, educational 
attainments will change as new generations enter and old generations leave; and numerous other 
considerations will further complicate unfolding events. But that China will end up somewhere 
in that range if it succeeds in becoming a developed economy is true by definition. China would 
also perhaps endure multiple economic crises as it pulls abreast of today’s leading economies, 
but so did South Korea. 
As China develops, its effects on other countries’ economies are becoming evident. 
Freeman (2006) estimates that the integration of China (and other formerly non-market 
economies) roughly doubles the global market economy’s labour force, but increases its capital 
by much less, depressing wages across the board. Khanna (2008), more optimistically, stresses 
how the same union increases the scope and scale for entrepreneurship, and thus for global 
prosperity.  
A fully developed China would dwarf the rest of the world as thoroughly as the United 
States did in the late 1940s. The entire US economy would match the combined economies of 
three or four large provinces of a high-income China, and today’s other G7 countries would 
match the economies of individual provinces of various sizes. Dealings between a fully 
developed China and the United States might plausibly resemble those between the United States 
and Britain, France or Italy today. Designing international political and economic institutions, 
treaties, and precedents capable of constructively shaping such a future might merit serious 
contemplation by policy-makers in today’s developed economies (Jacques 2009). 
That contemplation would obviously begin by assessing the realism of such a scenario. 
Meiji Japan, South Korea, and other late industrializers all ultimately embraced capitalism and 
liberal democracy – albeit after initial inconsistency, incompetence, compromise, and 
backsliding. China has not done this; and its leaders demonstrate no intention of doing this. Thus 
far, they are breaking a new trail.  
The chapters in this volume argue that China’s embrace of free markets is at best 
tentative and at worst insubstantial. China is not embracing free markets as presented in Western 
economics textbooks. China is not emulating Anglo-American free markets, nor German nor 
even Meiji Japan or postwar South Korean market economies. Market Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics is not Newspeak for “capitalism”, but an economic experiment of unproven 
sustainability. This makes China’s economic rise a qualified scenario: contingent upon either the 4 
 
current system’s continued adaptability or its ultimate abandonment for genuine market economy 
institutions. This also makes China intensely interesting to economists.  
 
3.   Markets, Socialism, and Chinese Characteristics 
China remains a Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat: the CCP leadership, elected 
representatives of the Proletariat, rules the economy’s “commanding heights” without 
opposition. The legitimacy of the CCP thus depends on its success in this. Since 1978, success 
has been gauged by sustained and broad-based economic prosperity.  
  The omnipresence of the CCP in China’s business enterprises tends to surprise foreign 
observers. The CCP controls the careers of all government officials and senior SOE managers, 
and appoints cadres to key Party positions in many large non-SOEs. Provincial and local Party 
cadres similarly advise many smaller non-SOEs. Promotions depend on success in promoting 
economic growth and loyalty to the Party hierarchy. The Party’s power to reward or punish 
aspiring bureaucrats and executives has grown stronger since the 1990s (Macgregor 2010).  
  Within these constraints, the system is a substantial meritocracy (Landry 2008). Cadres 
who oversee higher investment, rising per capita GDP, and other measurable signs of improved 
prosperity gain promotions to higher positions in the civil service, enterprise management, or the 
Party itself – if they also obey Party policies and directives (Macgregor 2010; Allen and Shen 
2012, this volume; Pistor 2012, this volume). Promotions are outcomes of an explicitly 
competitive tournament based substantially on quantitative, if imperfect and pliable, performance 
metrics (Lü 2000; Li et al. 2008). Career advancement based on meritocracy, rather than solely 
on ideological purity, deviates starkly from China’s Maoist era, but recalls the examination-
based civil service meritocracies that governed more flourishing eras in its Imperial past (Spence 
1999).  
  These promotions need not be vertical. SOE managers can be promoted into government 
or Party Positions, and cadres can be promoted into positions of influence in SOEs or non-SOEs 
(Allen and Shen, 2012, this volume; Li and Zhou 2005; Lü 2000; Landry 2008; Pistor (2012, this 
volume). For example, on April 3
rd 2011, state media reported the promotion of Su Shulin from 
chairman of China Petroleum and Chemical Corp (SINOPEC) to Fujian provincial Party leader. 
On April 8, the CCP OD announced that Fu Chengyu, then chairman of China National Offshore 
Oil Corp (CNOOC) was replacing Su at Sinopec, and that Wang Yilin, the former top manager 
of China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), the parent of PetroChina, was replacing Fu at 
CNOOC. When the music stopped, much to the consternation of foreign suppliers and 
customers, the CCP OD had rotated the top managers of China’s major oil companies.  
Such rotation plausibly broadens cadres’ connections networks and, perhaps most 
importantly, fosters cadres’ loyalty to the Party, rather than to specific localities, government 
agencies, enterprises, or shareholders. This is not utterly different from what happens in other 
countries. American investment bank CEOs become treasury secretaries and bank regulators, 
Canadian government auditors become corporate tax accountants; and the président et directeur 
général (PDG) of a French corporation is often a former civil servant from the ministry 
responsible for regulating that industry (Bertrand et al. 2010; Heilbrunn 2005; Kramarz & 
Thesmar 2006; Smith 2004). Career moves from government to business are sufficiently 
commonplace to justify the Académie Française sanctioned pantouflage (lit. shuffling wearing 5 
 
indoor slippers) and the Japanese amakudari (lit. descent from heaven). But such a system can 
invite corruption and entrench weak governance (Huang 2008; Xu 2011).  
 
3.1  Market Socialist CEOs  
Pistor (2012, this volume) reveals Chinese financial sector pantouflage operating differently 
from French, Japanese, or America elite networks. China’s centrally coordinated multiple 
bidirectional pantouflage is under overt Party control, and above criticism. America, France, and 
Japan are robust democracies, where abuses are exposed by an aggressively free press and 
constrained by open economies. The workings of the CCP OD better recall the Imperial Civil 
Service in pre-modern China, and its ready acceptance by the Chinese people perhaps accords 
with such a historical continuity. Western observers might understandably find this system 
bizarre; but many Chinese – even Western educated economists – seemingly regard it as such a 
self-evident part of the background as to hardly merit mention.  
Cadres’ success in overseeing economic growth depends on access to capital, and 
successive rounds of reform unfailingly preserved CCP control over the financial sector. All 
major banks are either SOEs or under tight control. In theory, at least, this lets SOE bankers 
direct capital to the SOE and non-SOE enterprises with the best prospects. But China is hardly 
unique in this: large SOE banks dominate other economies too (La Porta et al. 2002).  
  The CCP also provides ongoing and intensive training to promising cadres. The Party 
School and Civil Service School both teach modern management. Moreover, though China now 
boasts of numerous business schools, the Party School and Civil Service School are peerless for 
the connections and institutional knowledge their graduates obtain. But again, elite educational 
institutions and programs specifically designed for civil servants exist elsewhere. France’s École 
Nationale d’Administration and other grandes écoles fast-track promising students into elite 
government and business positions; as do Japan’s Imperial Universities and, legacy admissions 
aside, America’s Ivy League colleges. China today evokes Veblen’s (1921) concept of superstar 
engineers running a finely tuned precisely designed economic machine.  
The scope for government failure problems in such a system is substantial, and is 
developed explicitly below. However, its potential for genuine economic development should 
not go unrecognized. The CCP’s use of career incentives, capital allocation and training to 
promote economic growth allows the sort of economic engineering called for in Big Push 
industrialization (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Murphy et al. 1989). Each Party or government organ 
and every SOE or non-SOE top management team strives for economic success, but central Party 
coordination puts the focus on national economic success, rather than local or individual 
enterprise performance. Highlighting that this, not a covert adoption of capitalism, became the 
goal of Party pragmatists, Pistor explains tensions now distorting the Chinese economy and 
likely to loom larger as China develops. In particular, if growth is to persist, China’s leaders 
must sustain a genuine meritocracy in a culture that esteems family ties; and must overcome 
Hayek’s (1945) argument that information flows less freely through command and control 
structures as they grow larger and more complex.  
 
3.2   Market Socialist Corporate Governance 
Several chapters examine reforms to the regulation and governance of China’s listed enterprises, 
and a synthesis of their findings again highlights that something unique is happening. Listed 
firms have CEOs and dual boards, organized along German lines, with requirements for outside 6 
 
director participation in the full board and in key committees and many other features associates 
with tidy corporate governance. However, all this is likely at best a sideshow.  
Parallel this corporate governance system, each enterprise also has a Communist Party 
Committee, headed by a Communist Party Secretary. These advise the CEO on critical decisions, 
and are kept informed by Party cells throughout the enterprise that also monitor the 
implementation of party policies. Indeed, the Party Secretary plays a leading role in major 
decisions, and can overrule or bypass the CEO and board if necessary (Deng et al. 2011).  
For example, foreign independent directors on the board of China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) reportedly first learned of that enterprise’s takeover bid for Unocal, an 
American oil company, this from news broadcasts (Macgregor 2010). Directors often also learn 
of such major strategic moves, and of equally major personnel moves, such as the rotation of oil 
company top managers described above, after the fact. Despite their formal powers, CEOs and 
boards are thought to welcome Party advice, and any directors likely to have reservations are 
kept out of the loop to preserve harmony – especially if issues the CCP views as strategically 
important are involved. Party intervention in less strategic sectors, and in smaller enterprises, 
may well be less direct and overt, and the priorities of provincial and local Party cadres can 
deviate from those of top CCP cadres in Beijing.  
  Listed enterprises’ Party Secretaries and Committees are difficult to ignore. When the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges began trading in the 1990s, large SOEs were instructed 
to populate them with listed joint stock companies. The SOEs consequently organized 
subsidiaries whose financial ratios met the exchanges’ listing requirements, and floated minority 
interests in these via equity carve-out initial public offerings (IPOs). Both stock markets still 
feature many listed enterprises with vast total market capitalizations and miniscule public floats.  
Control blocks in these were retained by various government ministries or other state or 
Party organs, or by other listed SOEs in pyramidal holding company structures, and these blocks 
were designated as inalienable non-traded  shares. Reforms in the 2000s unified each listed 
enterprise’s traded and non-traded shares into a single alienable class, effectively turning full 
market capitalizations into potential public floats. Because this greatly increased the total 
quantity of equity available to savers, because non-traded shares owned directly by the central 
government were not required to pay dividends to the government until 2008, and (perhaps most 
importantly) because blocks of non-traded shares were reserved for employees and managers, 
valuations fell (Bayoumi et al., 2012, this volume) and existing traded-shareholders were 
compensated.  
Equity unification, by letting the governments and government agencies that previously 
held non-traded shares sell out, could transform the large SOE and SOE subsidiaries that still 
dominate both stock markets into fully privately-owned firms – albeit still assisted by their Party 
Secretaries and Party Committees.  
To date, Allen and Shen (2012, this volume) find little evidence of a widespread 
substantial increase in private share ownership, and conclude that government and Party officials 
retain control blocks in most listed enterprises, either directly or through pyramiding, especially 
in strategically important sectors such as banking. To illustrate, they examine ICBC, China’s 
second largest bank, and find that a scant 4.3% of its domestically traded shares are in private 
hands (ICBC has a class of “H shares” traded in Hong Kong that appear largely foreign-owned. 7 
 
H shareholders cannot outvote domestic shareholders. Consequently, the CCP continues to 
control most of the voting power in most listed firms’ shareholder meetings.  
Nonetheless, genuinely private ownership is rising. Allen and Shen (2012, this volume) 
find officially designated listed SOEs constituting over two-thirds of listings and including most 
very large enterprises. The remaining less than one third of listings, officially designated listed 
non-SOEs, consists of listed SOEs’ controlled subsidiaries and privately owned corporations. 
The CEOs and boards of listed SOEs are appointed by their parents’ CEOs, advised by their 
parents Party Secretaries. The CEOs and boards of all major listed non-SOEs and SOEs are 
advised directly by their own Party Secretaries and Party Committees (Yu, 2009).  
Much of China’s private sector consists of unlisted enterprises: local state-controlled 
cooperatives (township and village enterprises, or TVEs), many of which lease control rights to 
managers in transactions referred to as management buy-outs (MBOs). The sector also includes 
many joint ventures with multinationals, and numerous small single proprietorships, often of 
uncertain legal status. Preferring the term hybrid sector, Allen et al. (2012, this volume) and 
Gordon and Li (2012, this volume) examine local government-controlled enterprises, and 
suggest that their governance may be unexpectedly strong. Of course, all but the very smallest 
facilitate the organization of Party cells, and their CEOs value the advice of their Party 
Secretaries, whose connections and influence with regulators, officials, and SOE banks and 
business partners can be critical.  
The pause Allen and Shen (2012, this volume) observe in the transition of listed SOEs 
into fully privately owned firms could allow time for other reforms – either to facilitate their 
efficient regulation and corporate governance or to safeguard Party influence over their 
governance, or both. Allen and Shen (2012, this volume), and Allen et al. (2012, this volume), 
and Pistor (2012, this volume) describe the development of China’s financial regulations. All 
question the real traction of these reforms in doing what financial regulations do in capitalist 
economies, given corporations’ parallel governance systems.  
For example, China’s fully modern Corporate Governance Code authorizes shareholder 
derivative lawsuits and assigns fiduciary duties to directors and officers, though not Party 
Secretaries or Party Committee members. Judges are Party appointees, and their careers turn on 
their respect for Party policies and acceptance of Party guidance. Moreover, court rulings are 
enforced at the discretion of Party officials. For example, Allen et al. (2012, this volume) find 
bankruptcy rulings are rarely enforced because central government circulars applicable to SOE 
bankruptcies supersede the law, because local governments can halt cases, and because SOE 
banks prefer to avoid write-downs triggered by formal bankruptcies. Xu (2012, this volume), in 
reviewing this chapter, suggests that, despite CCP OD control over executives’ careers, banks 
financial operations are decentralized and sub-national government and Party influence may be 
more salient to local branch decisions regarding debt forgiveness. Allen et al. conclude that “for 
insolvent SOEs, what triggers the bankruptcy procedure is not their financial status per se, but 
whether they can get preferential treatment from the government.” Finally, court rulings need not 
protect creditors. Although the Supreme People’s Court ordered lower courts not to process 
bankruptcies designed solely to nullify debts in 2002, Garnaut et al. (2006) report that 90% of 
SOE CEOs surveyed believe bankruptcy to be “a feasible channel to evade bank debts.”  
Piotroski and Wong (2012, this volume) suggest that weak regulation and discretionary 
enforcement render Chinese corporate financial reporting unreliable, leaving listed enterprises 
opaque to outside investors. This prevents outside shareholders and creditors from questioning 
managerial decisions; but also prevents capital market forces from channelling people’s savings 8 
 
to their highest value uses. Jin (2012, this volume) argues that public investors may not demand 
transparency because central government policies, not enterprise policies, are the main drivers of 
stock prices.  
All this surely diminishes marginal shareholders’ valuations. Rational investors would 
discount the future dividend streams to account for governance and regulation deficiencies, and 
buy if share prices subside enough. The continued existence of Chinese stock markets is thus not 
threatened by such deficiencies, and investors can presumably expect fair risk-adjusted returns. 
But the governments and SOEs that sell their control blocks to investors will receive less per 
share, all else equal.  
More importantly, the social purpose of a stock market is not to persist, nor even to fill 
the coffers of privatizing governments, but to direct savings to their highest value uses (Tobin 
1984; Wurgler 2000). Intrusive Party involvement in corporate governance would dam off 
market forces and entrust this task to cadres. The CCP is far more professional than in the past, 
and ideologues are largely replaced by pragmatists; so Party guidance may well substitute for 
market forces – effectively turning China’s listed enterprises into industrial policy tools. In other 
countries, state-led industrial policies often manage spurts of high early-stage growth, but then 
fail because capital allocation becomes more difficult in later stage growth, when creativity and 
productivity enhancement matter more than capacity expansion, and because political rent-
seeking consumes ever-increasing resources (Easterly 2006). Perhaps this time is different.  
 
3.3   Market Socialist Bankers 
The Panic of 2008 and subsequent recession leave Ango-American stock market-based 
capitalism in some disrepute. In theory information-laden share prices guide capital towards 
firms with sound investment opportunities and away from firms that look ill-run; and well 
informed bank loan officers lend to firms with sound business plans and deny loans to dodgy 
firms (Tobin 1984). In practice, financial bubbles and crises misallocate capital, but most 
developed capitalist economies’ financial systems appear to perform these tasks tolerably 
efficiently most of the time (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Wurgler 2000). Nonetheless, legitimate 
concerns attach to relying on stock markets to allocate capital in developing economies (Morck, 
Yeung and Yu 2000; Jin and Myers 2006). If China largely disconnects its stock markets from 
capital allocation decisions, its banks might nonetheless channel market forces.  
Allen et al. (2012, this volume) show most bank lending flowing to SOEs, rather than the 
hybrid sector they find better equipped to generate wealth – despite SOEs’ ongoing accumulation 
of nonperforming loans. Their findings suggest that politics and connections dominate financial 
viability in bank loan allocation decisions, sheltering banks from market forces as well. 
Unsurprisingly, simultaneous capital shortages and surpluses ensue – affecting different. The 
capital shortage in the hybrid sector is due to the lending bias of state-controlled banks, which 
prefer to lend to large state-controlled enterprises; and frequent government intervention in the 
financial system merely reinforces this bias. In consequence, an informal financial sector – 
arguably, a shadow banking sector with Chinese characteristics – has arisen to provide credit to 
the many hybrid enterprises the banks neglect. In a prior paper, Allen et al. (2008) argue that the 
informal sector can substitute for the formal banking sector; and the chapters in this volume do 
not contradict this. However, the informal financial sector’s sources of capital are opaque, 
rendering meaningful assessment of the sector’s size, stability, and efficiency highly problematic. 9 
 
Moreover, the high interest the sector charges hybrid enterprises, most of which are small and 
median sized operations, and the sometimes severe consequences they suffer for missing a 
payment, suggest that the informal financial sector provides very costly capital. This may well be 
commensurate with high lending risks, but again, a quantitative assessment is stymied by the 
sector’s opacity. China’s shadow banking system, like Americas in previous years, may well 
conceal hidden sources of instability and inefficiency.  
  Pistor (2012, this volume) utilizes the tools of network analysis to document webs of 
personal ties between Party cadres in charge of China’s banks and financial regulators. This 
dense network of linkages centered on cadres in key CCP organs, contrasts vividly with banks’ 
formal chains of accountability designed along Western lines. While individual banks, business 
enterprises, and regulatory agencies appear distinct on paper, they are actually highly integrated 
because the CCP OD handles HRM decisions throughout all of them (Macgregor 2010). The 
future careers of top bankers and bank regulators thus depend on how cadres in the CCP OD 
assess their performance. If the quality of lending decisions predominates in these assessments, 
an increasingly professionalized and pragmatic Party might tolerably well incentivize bankers to 
lend efficiently. But if ideological purity, faction loyalty, or outright corruption take precedence, 
massive capital misallocation is likely.  
  Pistor (2012, this volume) finds that the prominence of the CCP OD is not a Maoist 
holdover awaiting reform, but a solution CCP cadres designed and built to safeguard the Party’s 
control over Lenin’s Commanding Heights as reforms progressed. Thus, China complies fully 
with WTO requirements to liberalize and deregulate, even as the CCP OD integrates top 
personnel at banks, borrower enterprises, regulatory bodies, governments, and the Party itself; 
with loyalty and job performance, in uncertain balance, the criteria for promotion throughout.  
These considerations lead Pistor to interpret Chinese pantouflage as qualitatively 
different from its French, Japanese, or American cognates; though she does not preclude the 
possibility that future reforms might lead to convergence. As countries grow richer, tolerably 
efficient capital allocation becomes both more urgent and more difficult. If China persists with 
its current system, regulatory capture problems (Stigler 1971) seem likely to defeat even the best 
de jure financial regulations. Allen and Shen (2012, this volume), Allen et al. (2012, this volume) 
and Pistor (2012, this volume) argue that reforms effectively separating banks from their 
regulators would substantially improve the quality of capital allocation over the longer term. 
However, Song (2012, this volume) argues that the system Pistor (2012, this volume) describes 
could minimize systemic shocks while delivering politically acceptable growth for some time yet 
(see also Deng et al. 2011).  
 
3.4   Market Socialist Tycoons and Entrepreneurs 
Forbes Magazine lists more US dollar millionaires in China in 2011 than anywhere else save the 
United States itself. Wang and Woo (2011) argue that China’s official data vastly underestimate 
rising Chinese inequality over the past two decades. Forsaking Maoist orthodoxy, China heeded 
Deng Xiaoping’s call to “let a few people get rich first” as a prelude to broader development. 
Faster economic development may well cause greater inequality, for a time at least, 
because the talents needed to organize an economy’s resources efficiently are scarce and 
command high prices in the free market (Kuznets 1955). Persons possessing exceptional 
judgement (Knight 1921), foresight (Hayek 1941), creativity (Schumpeter 1911), technological 
skills (Veblen 1921), organizational ability (Coase 1937), or other rare and valuable skills 10 
 
accumulate wealth first, aggravating inequality, before their businesses create a large affluent 
middle class that mitigates inequality.  
However, inequality per se need not cause development. If a nation enriches an elite 
largely bereft of these unique talents, inequality can lock in stagnation (Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung 2005). This is because an inadequately talented elite rationally fears development, for this 
would require its displacement by a talented elite, and uses its political power to preserve the 
status quo (Olson 2000). Such low-level poverty traps well characterize much Latin American 
history (Haber 2000; Edwards 2009).  
The talents of China’s nouveaux riches – its Communist millionaire class – are thus 
important. If Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics reliably entrusts capital to 
appropriately talented people, development can progress and inequality can abate. But if spoiled 
princelings, gray apparatchiks, ideological zealots, or scheming sycophants rise to the top more 
reliably, China risks emulating the Ottoman Empire, 20
th century Latin America, or Tsarist 
Russia, and combining brutal inequity with chronic economic lassitude.  
The various chapters document how China’s business elites owe their positions to Party 
favour, or at least forbearance. But even very small-scale private businesses are subject to Party 
guidance. Any enterprise employing more than three Party members must allow a Communist 
Party Cell to organize and select a Secretary. This allows the CCP in Beijing to keep up-to-date 
on any rising firm’s business operations and plans, provide important advice at critical junctures, 
and assist its CEO in complying with regulatory constraints or negotiating exemptions with 
government officials or Party cadres.  
All this raises fundamental questions about China’s business elite: are they primarily 
entrepreneurs or apparatchiks? Allen et al. (2012, this volume) argue that many are 
entrepreneurs. Defining the hybrid sector as all non-SOE unlisted firms, including privately 
owned businesses and enterprises partially owned by local governments – including Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVEs) – they see competition between local governments mitigating 
inefficiency. This, they argue, makes TVEs and other local government-controlled enterprises 
resemble purely private businesses more closely than large SOEs and SOE subsidiaries.  
Even if not entirely free of state influence, the hybrid sector likely has the greatest 
potential for fostering economic, rather than political entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990; Murphy et 
al 1991). Its success is thus an important public policy issues. The corporate tycoons who run the 
SOEs, listed SOEs’ subsidiaries, and ex-SOEs that constitute China’s big business sector are 
largely career cadres. The Party strives to select the best and brightest, and provides ongoing 
high-quality training; but bureaucratic hierarchies are generally ill-suited to rewarding creativity. 
Economic entrepreneurship thus appears dependent on the financial system identifying and 
backing promising entrants and upstarts in the hybrid sector.  
Consistent with corporate savings primarily arising in small non-SOE businesses, the 
hybrid sector finances most of its capital investment out of enterprise savings – 60% for the 
sector overall and 90% for purely private businesses – with informal debt, such as trade credit, 
making up much of the remainders. The hybrid sector’s high dependence on retained earnings 
for expansion indicates that China’s major banks have yet to make major inroads in financing 
economic entrepreneurs. Allen et al. (2012, this volume), documenting the entrance of new non-
SOE banks and intermediaries, discern a diminution of the big SOE banks’ supremacy. That 
entrant banks might better channel capital to economic entrepreneurs remains to be seen.  
In explaining this reticence in lending to hybrid-sector businesses, Allen et al. (2012, this 
volume) highlight the non-performing loan (NPL) of the major SOE banks. Arguing that these 11 
 
NPLs are largely a “policy burden” – the banks extended loans under political pressure – and that 
the burden is greater than a cursory inspection of the banks’ balance sheets indicates; they argue 
that if the CCP desires continued high growth, a more complete immunization the big SOE 
banks’ NPL problem might be warranted. They argue that purchases of banks equity by the 
Central Huijin Investment Company, a sovereign wealth fund initially capitalized by the 
People’s bank of China, helped solidify the banks’ capital bases, but did not entirely solve their 
NPL problems. Moreover, the share purchases left the large SOE banks even more firmly under 
Party control and SOE bankers still jittery about risky lending.  
These findings suggest that Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics does not 
allocate national savings to the most efficient users of capital. Because hybrid sector enterprises 
rely on trade credit, rather than financial institutions and markets, for capital, they are subject to 
their suppliers’ and customers’ terms and conditions. Trade credit in Western economies tends to 
an expensive source of capital.  
In summary, China’s tycoons, its barons of big business, are predominantly career 
bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats: cadres the CCP Organization Department promoted through top 
positions in large SOEs and SOE subsidiaries. China’s banking system appears well suited to 
channelling capital to these cadre-tycoons. China’s entrepreneurs, who appear most often in the 
hybrid sector, rely largely on savings, somewhat on trade credit, and seemingly very little on the 
financial system.  
 
3.5   Market Socialist Capital 
Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is nonetheless capitalizing China rapidly – in the 
sense of eliciting an extraordinarily high and rising savings rate. As Prasad (2009) notes, 
investment pushes growth in China to an unprecedented extent, and consumption constitutes the 
lowest fraction of GDP ever recorded in any major economy.  
This presents a dual puzzle to Yang et al. (2012, this volume). Since the 1978 advent of 
Market Socialism, China’s savings rate never dipped below 34% - far above the savings rates 
typical of other countries: developed or developing. Why is China’s savings rate so high?” From 
2000 on, China’s savings rate climbed steadily so that Chinese now save roughly one yuan out of 
every two. This is 3.3 times the average savings rate for other low income countries and 2.4 
times the global average. Why, they ask, is China’s unprecedentedly high savings rate yet 
rising?”  
Young’s (2012, this volume) discussion argues that Chinese consumers and enterprises 
have much higher incomes than the data show because of inadequate exchange rate adjustments 
to purchasing power parity, and consequently only appear to save much more than foreigners. 
This corroborates Wang and Woo’s (2011) contention that official Chinese aggregate 
consumption figures are vastly understated because they omit gray market transactions. Citing 
low-cost loans from SOE banks and ubiquitous debt forgiveness and the fact that SOE dividends 
are not actually paid in many cases, Young argues that many enterprises actual costs are far 
below the nominal costs reported in their annual reports. Adding that local governments are 
awash in incomes from land lease sales, and ought not to spend all these proceeds at once, he is 
also unsurprised by high government savings rates.  
  China’s national income accounts display other irregularities. For example, provincial 
GDPs in past years typically summed to more than national GDP. Lequiller and Blades (2006, c. 
13) ties such anomalies to the Material Products System (MPS), an input-output framework for 
monitoring production quota attainment under central planning still used to track enterprise and 12 
 
regional economy performance. Tying data collection to performance evaluation plausibly 
encourages inflated production reports: for example, exaggerated agricultural production reports 
are blamed for excessive exports and rural starvation during the Great Leap Forward (Lü 2000; 
Yang 2008). The central government’s statistics, which adjust MPS data using surveys, may be 
more reliable than the provincial numbers, which typically do not; however broader surveys by 
the central government finding its official figures on GDP to be too low triggered major upwards 
adjustments in 2005 (Lequiller and Blades, 2006, p. 377) - though Wu (2006) posits politics, not 
statistical accuracy, driving these adjustments. While China’s national income accounting is 
flawed, the data are not meaningless. Other countries at similar stages of development quite 
plausibly have similar or worse data, yet do not display comparable anomalies. Maddison and 
Wu (2008) painstakingly dissect Chinese national income accounts and report distortions, but not 
futility.  
  Accepting China’s national income accounts at face value, Yang et al. (2012, this 
volume) scrutinize its rapid and accelerating pace of capitalization, and weigh alternative 
explanations of it. They consider, but ultimately dismiss, a cultural explanation: Savings rates 
tend to be high across East Asia, where traditional values extol savings. But traditional Asian 
values are not obviously stronger in China than elsewhere in the region, and are not obviously 
becoming even stronger in China faster than elsewhere. Moving on to economics-based 
explanations, they divide savings into that by enterprises, governments, and households. This 
reveals more patterns. 
 First,  this  exposes  a long-run trend. In the early years of market socialism, government 
and enterprise savings were large and household savings were small. But as China developed, 
household savings rose steadily, while the other categories waned. But after 2000, all three 
surged, with government savings soaring fastest.  
  Government savings rose because tax revenues rose faster than government spending. 
Yang et al. (2012, this volume) link this to an ongoing “rich country – poor people” controversy, 
arguing that pressure for more spending on public goods and services is likely to reverse this 
trend. However, Chen (2012, this volume) disagrees, arguing that Party leaders view government 
wealth accumulation as a pure policy objective. Yang et al. (2012, this volume) also suggest that 
demography may warrant a high government savings rate: the one-child policy means a low 
child dependency ratio now, but a very high seniors dependency ratio in the future.  
   Enterprise savings are an ambiguity because many enterprises remain state controlled. 
The distinction between government and enterprise savings, though clear for accounting 
purposes, is somewhat blurry for economic conclusions. Nominal enterprise earnings rose 
sharply from the 1990s on, probably reflecting a confluence of favourable developments. New 
technology and better management improved productivity. Weak domestic competitive pressure 
and WTO access to foreign markets sustained revenues. Subsidized loans from SOE banks and 
largely de jure illegal migration of labor from the countryside contained capital and labour costs, 
as did a generally unresponsive Party stance against labour unrest. These conditions let 
enterprises accumulate savings; however, the chapter argues that price competition will likely 
erode enterprise savings as reforms progress.  
In terms of market share concentration, competition appears robust in China (Nee and 
Opper 2011). But the financial system’s indisposition to allocate capital to hybrid sector 
enterprises (Allen and Shen, 2012, this volume; Allen et al., 2012, this volume) may well be a 
high barrier to entry for unconnected would-be entrepreneurs. The true strength of competition in 13 
 
China is thus ambiguous, and competition could be a public policy problem despite relatively 
low concentration. 
Yang et al. (2012, this volume) explain how household savings rose markedly – from 6 to 
7% in 1978 to 22% in 2007 – with a rising propensity to save with income, as in Chamon et al. 
(2010). Yang et al. (2012, this volume) find China’s age-savings profile, previously “hump 
shaped” as in a life-cycle savings theory (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954), inverting after 2000. 
That is, just as China’s savings rate shoots skyward, the curve flips: households headed by very 
young and very old people now save more than households headed by middle-aged people. 
Reviewing the literature on dependency ratios and savings, they argue support Chamon and 
Prasad (2008) who, reporting a similar pattern, present a “buffer-stock” model of savings: 
younger households save to buy homes; older households save for medical expenses and old age 
security. 
Expanding this, Yang et al. (2012, this volume) advance another more subtle 
demographic explanation: competitive savings. China’s one child policy greatly skewed its 
gender ratios, and marriageable women are now in short supply. Families might therefore save to 
help their sons attract wives, an idea initially raised by Wei and Zhang (2011). Confirming this 
suggestion, they find markedly higher savings rates in provinces with fewer females. While 
alternative explanations are possible – for example, these might also be provinces where 
traditional values are strongest – the possibility of unfolding unintended economic consequences 
to the venerable Chinese preference for sons is intriguing, and deserves further investigation  
Noting that prior unemployment does not greatly increase savings, they dismiss an 
augmented precautionary savings motive due to middle-aged SOE employees’ job insecurity 
However, they are unable to preclude broader effects associated with the private provision of 
education, health care, and housing. Student loans, mortgages, and private health insurance 
remain largely inaccessible privately, and the government has yet to provide universal health 
care. Allen et al. (2012, this volume) document a stunted insurance industry, so households have 
little alternative but to manage health and other risks with aggressive precautionary savings. All 
this is consistent with Chamon and Prasad (2008): young households may be saving to buy 
homes, cars, and appliances because mortgages and consumer loans are not generally available; 
old households may be frantically saving in anticipation of looming heath care costs because 
insurance is not generally available. The rising savings rate in recent years also fits the narrative 
in Chamon and Prasad (2008) and Yang et al. (2012, this volume): housing prices rose sharply in 
the same period as pension replacement rates fell The chapter predicts that future reforms to 
remedy these gaps are apt to reduce China’s savings rate.  
 
 
3.6   Market Socialist Profits 
Yet another reason for high savings could be that individuals do not consider the savings of 
business enterprises to be relevant to their personal well-being. In a country with widely held 
corporations, an efficient stock market, and strong shareholder rights, savings by business 
enterprises can be expected to translate into future dividends to individuals. However, most large 
Chinese listed enterprises have tiny, often single digit public floats. Most of their shares belong 
to government or Party organs, directly or through intermediary SOE holding companies. 
Moreover, most Chinese individuals do not own shares. A sort of Ricardian equivalence might 
nonetheless prevail: individual Chinese might expect high future dividends payable to state 
organs to lower individual tax rates in the future. However, cynicism about the efficiency of this 14 
 
indirect savings method might well disconnect enterprise savings from individuals’ 
consumption-savings decisions.  
China’s national income accounts suggest high enterprise savings, and Bayoumi et al. 
(2012, this volume) re-examine China’s savings puzzle using financial data disclosed by 
enterprises trading on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Their startling, and very robust, 
conclusion is that listed Chinese enterprises do not retain substantially more earnings than 
comparable listed firms elsewhere. Moreover, the data show substantial declines in listed 
enterprises’ savings after 2000. This result, combined with the findings in Yang et al. (2012, this 
volume) imply either that unlisted enterprises savings drive both the high overall enterprise 
savings rate and the post-2000 surge in enterprise savings Yang et al. (2012, this volume) discern 
in macroeconomic data, or that something is seriously amiss with Chinese data. Accepting the 
validity of both firm-level and macroeconomic data, despite the reservations of Piotroski and 
Wong (2012, this volume) regarding the former and the problems in China’s national income 
accounts data raised above, several reconciliations are possible.  
Most obviously, as, Zu’s discussion (2012, this volume) contends, listed enterprises may 
be qualitatively different in numerous dimensions from unlisted enterprises, making different 
savings rates unremarkable. One set of differences likely to matter is access to capital. Listed 
enterprises, able to issue shares, can raise funds readily to finance new growth opportunities as 
they arise; while unlisted enterprises, unable to tap equity markets, must pile up retained earnings 
as corporate savings accounts to be drawn down in the future as needed. Or, the top executives of 
listed enterprises may have stronger personal connections to SOE bankers, or to Party and 
government officials capable of influencing SOE bank lending decisions. Thus, unlisted firms 
might need savings because they lack access to credit, while listed firms’ well connected insiders 
might make enterprise savings unnecessary. The strength of such insiders’ connections varies 
across enterprises, and can be measured (Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007). Bayoumi et al. (2012, this 
volume) confirm that listed enterprises with stronger Party connections have lower savings rates; 
though they link this to lower net earnings, not higher retained earnings.  
Either reconciliation incriminates financial system infirmities for China’s high 
macroeconomic enterprise savings rate, specifically fingering relatively financially isolated and 
politically unconnected unlisted enterprises. If so, reforms that would let capital market forces 
allocate savings impartially to their highest value uses are a likely policy option to make high 
growth sustainable. Allen and Shen (2012, this volume), Allen et al. (2012, this volume) and 
Piotroski and Wong (2012, this volume) elaborate on such reforms.  
Still another possible reconciliation is that unlisted enterprises, shielded from public view 
and foreign criticism, have more flexibility allocating their retained earnings. If so, listed firms 
might tunnel (Johnson et al. 2000) income to their unlisted parents, or to other entities from 
which insiders can readily move capital to where they feel it is needed. Tunnelled funds could 
appear as costs in the subsidiaries’ financial statements and retained earnings in those of their 
parent SOEs. Amid rapid economic development, this freedom of action can be justified as a 
means of overcoming network externalities, first mover hold-up problems, and other 
coordination problems that arise in early stages of industrialization (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; 
Morck and Nakamura 2007; Morck 2011) and recent empirical work supports this thesis (Fan et 
al. 2010). However, the same freedom of action also creates scope for corruption on a grand 
scale, and raises the possibility that high earnings retentions by unlisted enterprises might be 
bookkeeping entries concealing unaccountably enriched insiders.  
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3.7   Market Socialist Debts 
Allen et al. (2012, this volume) document a very rapid growth in government bond issues, with 
outstanding bonds totalling some RMB 10 trillion (US$1.44 trillion) by December 2008. 
Virtually all is government debt: about 50% is government bonds, about 37% are the bonds of 
SOE policy banks, and the remaining 13% are the debts of large Chinese enterprises, virtually all 
of which are either SOEs or subsidiaries of SOEs. The absence of fully private-sector bonds is 
quite plausibly due to China’s politicized bankruptcy process (Allen et al., 2012, this volume).  
Chen (2012, this volume) examines China’s government debt, but from the viewpoint of 
creditors. In December 2004, China’s national debt stood at RMB 2.96 trillion – just under 22% 
of GDP. Of this, 97% was owned to domestic lenders, and only 3% was owed to foreigners. The 
total was 21.6% of GDP, well below the internationally-recognized warning limit of 60%. In 
2003, interest payments on the national debt cost RMB 300 billion, about 14% of fiscal revenue. 
These figures, Chen argues, probably greatly understate the real debt payments because they do 
not adjust for SOE banks’ NPLs. Citing estimates ranging from 29% to 36% of GDP for these, 
Chen re-estimates China’s total national debt as somewhere between 50% and 58% of GDP. 
This, he notes, approaches the 60% threshold, above which creditors begin sounding alarms.  
The high government savings documented by Yang et al. (2012, this volume) need 
reconciliation with a large government debt. Yang et al. net Chinese government inflows and 
outflows and assess government savings in 2003 at RMB 944.5 billion, roughly one tenth of 
bonds outstanding. Consistent with government savings and debts partially offsetting each other, 
Chen reports a RMB 200 billion rise in government bond issues (from RMB 400 billion in 
2000), even as Yang et al. report government savings rising by about RMB 620 billion (from 
325.5 billion in 2000). Clearly, accumulated government savings cannot be explained by bond 
issue proceeds, but the simultaneous accumulation of debts and savings remains incompletely 
explained.  
Chinese officials’ motives for borrowing and saving simultaneously, and both on very 
large scales, are harder to square. One possibility is that the central government might be 
borrowing and local or regional governments might be saving. Alternatively, the two might 
reflect an underlying unity. For example, the central government might be borrowing during a 
period of low international interest rates to accumulate capital for future needs; or borrowing in 
one currency and saving in another to control the exchange rate. This puzzle requires more work.  
  Contemplating China’s large government debt, Chen sees a stark deviation from 
traditional characteristically Chinese policies. Throughout the Ming and Qing dynasties, China’s 
rulers equated good government with the accumulation vast silver hoards, to be drawn down 
should natural disaster or war arise. In these mercantilist aims, China resembled most pre-
modern governments, Asian and European (Macdonald 2003). Emperors typically increased 
taxes and debased or inflated the currency to supplement drained silver hoards. As in medieval 
Europe, forced lending to princes who dwelt above the law ultimately elevated credit risk 
sufficiently to destroy the market. Confirming this, financially strapped 19
th century Qing rulers 
defaulted on the forced loans they extracted from a nascent banking industry (Fan and Morck 
2010).  
    Chen (2012, this volume) accepts Macdonald’s (2003) argument that limited 
governments can borrow more readily because they can less readily nullify their debts, and that 
this induces a positive feedback loop wherein governments, concerned about tapping bond 
markets, act more responsibly, which elevates their reputations, which government officials 
come to value, and so on. This virtuous circle, Macdonald argues, let Western governments 16 
 
borrow to finance infrastructure, war, and other expenditures; while China traditionally had to 
save up for such things.  
  Of course, bond market discipline is not the only possible check on irresponsible 
government spending. Profligate local and provincial governments that run up unmanageable 
debts may invite scrutiny by the CCP OD, and the career opportunities of those deemed 
responsible might be curtailed – especially if the meritocratic aspects of Market Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics persist and deepen. Alternatively, an unwillingness to acknowledge 
errors might keep China from achieving this virtuous confluence. China’s public debt is mostly 
owed to domestic creditors, who still have few other savings options – basically bank accounts, 
domestic (mostly SOE or SOE related) stocks, and a few SOE-run mutual funds. While 
irresponsible government policies might increase China’s borrowing costs, its creditors’ power to 
discipline the government and the Party is limited. Even if a bond market develops, Chinese 
bondholders are unlikely to become prominent on the economy’s Commanding Heights. CCP 
discipline seems more feasible, if less certain, at least in the foreseeable future.  
  
3.8   Market Socialist Public Finance 
Gordon and Li (2012, this volume) examine public finance under Market Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics more generally. Noting that China’s economy has grown extraordinarily rapidly 
despite multiple checks on market forces, they posit a role for something akin to Tiebout (1956) 
competition, wherein competition for taxpayers forces governments to provide public goods and 
services efficiently.  
Tiebout competition achieves this if taxpayers can either vote out incumbent politicians 
or exit, carrying their tax checks to other jurisdictions that provide more or better public goods 
per yuan of taxes. At present, contested elections are restricted to village councils, so 
incumbents’ fear of voter wrath is an unlikely force for public sector efficiency.  
Exit is also a limited option because individual taxpayers cannot freely relocate. 
Recapitulating traditional feudal labor mobility restrictions, the People’s Republic of China’s 
hukou system, established in 1949 and reorganized into its current form in 1958, assigns each 
individual to a locality, designates her residence as either urban or rural, and is hereditary. 
Changing one’s hukou requires the permission of officials in both the old and new jurisdiction, 
and is currently difficult – especially for relatively unskilled people – because of concerns about 
a brain drain from poor regions and shanty towns developing in high growth provinces. A skill-
based point system is coming into use among migrant-receiving provinces. Illegal migrants are 
becoming commonplace, but cannot send their children to state schools or utilize other 
government services, raising the spectre of an entrenched urban underclass. At present, the 
migration of individuals is unlikely to contribute to strong Tiebout competition.  
However, Gordon and Li (2012, this volume) argue that, even though individual mobility 
may be hampered, many business enterprises’ activities are mobile across regions, and respond 
to competitive incentives offered both by and to village, township, municipal, province-level 
city, provincial, and regional (hereinafter “local” for brevity) government officials. Most 
obviously, local officials whose administrations provide better public goods for lower tax and 
regulatory costs attract firms to tax. If local officials cause their jurisdictions to compete for 
business activity, and cause the enterprises they govern to maximize their profits, something akin 
to social welfare maximization might theoretically ensue.  
Moreover, local officials, often doubling as top executives of the hybrid enterprises their 
jurisdictions established, also have direct incentives to ensure those enterprises maximize profits 17 
 
– including by moving operations to jurisdictions that offer prospects of higher profits. This is 
because, between 1978 and 1994, local governments received both profits and tax revenue from 
all the enterprises they established, and their local government officials had free hand to spend 
much of that revenue as they liked. After a major tax reform in 1994, local governments still 
remained the de facto residual claimants to those enterprises’ after-tax earnings net of mandated 
spending, and local government officials remained largely free to spend these funds as they 
chose. Local government officials thus gain larger discretionary budgets by ensuring that the 
hybrid enterprises they control generate higher profits by allocating resources more efficiently 
(Gordon and Li 1995; Li 1997).  
If local officials’ discretionary cash flow maximization induces local governments to 
compete for business activity and induces hybrid enterprises to maximize their residual cash 
flows, something approaching efficient resource allocation might ensure. However, some caveats 
are clearly in order. Local government officials, striving to maximize the residual earnings of 
enterprises that provide them with discretionary cash flow, might distort local policies to favor 
those enterprises to the disadvantage of the general citizenry. For example, such officials might 
skew local taxes, fees, or regulations, or might press local managers of state owned banks, to 
favor enterprises whose residual budgets they control. The social welfare benefits of such 
policies are far from clear. Second, fattened local government coffers need not translate into 
more or better public goods – a problem epitomized as China’s a “rich nation – poor people” 
dichotomy. Indeed, in something akin to the “free cash flow” agency problems Jensen (1986) 
documents in cash-rich US firms with unaccountable CEOs, fiscal revenues excess to basic 
spending commitments were dispensed by essentially unaccountable local officials. Cash-rich 
sub-national governments, it is now widely recognized, actually provided very poor public goods 
and services. In response, to the “rich nation – poor people” problem, further mid-1990s reforms 
shifted influence over bank lending from local to central government and Party officials who, it 
was hoped, would more reliably allocate public funds to provide badly needed public goods. 
Gordon and Li (2012, this volume) point out that many local governments switched to raising 
revenues from land lease sales, but remark that this is an exhaustible source of revenues.  
Finally, Li (2012, this volume), in discussing this chapter, argues that local officials care 
more about promotions, which affect their long-term earnings, than about their current 
discretionary budgets, and are therefore guided primarily by Party dictates from Beijing.  
Nonetheless, China has grown far more impressively than its widely panned institutions 
would seem to warrant. The premise of Gordon and Li (2012, this volume), that Market 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has unappreciated efficiency, is thus clearly worth 
pursuing. To explore this premise, they develop a simple, yet elegant, model of local public 
finance under these reforms, assuming local bureaucrats maximize tax revenue net of spending 
on public goods. This is defensible, in that top local bureaucrats have substantial discretion over 
how their governments’ revenues are spent once mandated public goods are provided. The model 
treats local governments as profit maximizing entities that can attract business activity by 
providing public goods more efficiently.  
  With competitive elections unlikely in the foreseeable future, Gordon and Li (2012, this 
volume) consider options that the CCP might consider should it wish to strengthen public sector 
efficiency, weighing the pros and cons of retail sales taxes, value-added taxes, and property taxes 
under market socialism. They further suggest user fees as an option. To the extent that local 
governments compete for users who value the public goods those fees finance, a more efficient 
local governments – that is, one that provides more or better public goods for lower user fees – 18 
 
earns higher tax revenues, all else equal. However, they caution, user fees evoke inequality 
problems. Poorer families might not send their children to school since if school user fees appear 
prohibitive, for example, planting the seeds of future economic and social problems.  
  Hukou reform, they argue, is most likely consistent with improved resource allocation. 
Because rural-to-urban and poor-to-rich region migration is already occurring, they argue that 
integrating migrants and educating their children should be a priority if the government wishes to 
avoid entrenching inequality problems. They suggest that hukou reform and the formalization of 
farm land ownership and sales would allow migrants to arrive better positioned to contribute to 
their new communities and the rationalization of land use in rural areas. After hukou reforms, the 
original Tiebout (1956) model would apply directly. In competing for taxpaying residents, local 
governments would be incentivized to provide whatever public goods residents were willing to 
pay for, and to provide them at the lowest possible cost in terms of taxes, fees, and other burdens. 
 
4.  Market Socialist Market Forces  
China has made a substantial start towards full-fledged economic development under an 
economic model unfamiliar to Western economic historians. That system, Market Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, is not “capitalism in a Mao suit”, despite popular reports of China’s 
alleged embrace of capitalism. Extensive regulatory, legal, and administrative reforms that evoke 
developed market economies’ institutions are deliberately superficial. While market forces 
function, to an extent, these reforms cloak an economy whose commanding heights remain 
unambiguously subject to Party control. That control flows through a traditional Chinese 
command and control mechanism, an unassailable civil service.  
   This system is delivering rapid economic growth, thereby restoring legitimacy to the CCP 
after disastrous misadventures such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and 
troubling incidents such as the student protests of 1989 and increasingly commonplace labour 
unrest since 2000. The socialist and Chinese aspects of China’s economic system, at least as 
much as its market aspects, are seen by top Party cadres as crucial to this success (Macgregor 
2010). 
The socialist foundation of China’s economic system is the unconditional supremacy of 
the Chinese Communist Party. Consistent with Marxist-Leninist tradition, the Party directs the 
law. Regulations, laws, and administrative rulings are applied in accordance with current Party 
policy. Just as a Party position corresponds directly to each key position in government, a Party 
hierarchy parallels corporate governance in banks, SOEs, listed non-SOEs, hybrid enterprises, 
joint ventures, and sufficiently large private businesses. Party cells throughout business 
enterprises constitute parallel internal accountability systems to those established by enterprises 
themselves, keeping an enterprise’s Party Secretary and Party Committee up-to-date and able to 
provide timely advice to its CEO and board. Imported corporate governance regulations, 
mandating independent directors and the like essentially ignore Party involvement in enterprise 
governance.  
The most uniquely Chinese characteristic of Market Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics is the CCP’s reliance on compensation and promotion incentives throughout an 
all-encompassing civil service to effect Party policies. Presiding over a more prosperous village, 
township, city, SOE, non-SOE, province, or industry appears genuinely important in advancing a 
cadre’s career. Luck may be imperfectly distinguished from good governance, and loyalty may 
too often trump competence; but a degree of genuine meritocracy is evident in empirical studies 
of promotions (Landry 2008), and Party training programs are increasingly rigorous and 19 
 
technocratic. These developments may explain why China’s seemingly weak institutions deliver 
better economic results that do other countries with seemingly equivalently weak institutions.  
Market forces affect economic decisions, in that most prices are no longer centrally 
administered and SOEs no longer receive production quotas from central planners. Profits 
motivate the allocation of many resources and the organization of much economic activity; and 
entrepreneurs can set up new businesses where demand arises if they can find financial backing. 
But the ongoing proletarian dictatorship of the CCP and Party oversight of human resource 
management decisions throughout the economy make China a severely qualified market 
economy. “Market” is rightly a mere adjective and only one fifth of Market Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics.  
High-income market economies depend on high-quality government to set limits, 
arbitrate disputes, and enforce rules (North 1991). Elsewhere, this entails checks and balances on 
officials to prevent abuse. China’s leaders appear interested in developing such checks and 
balances, but while retaining the Party’s primacy. That this choice is feasible remains unclear.  
This may not matter greatly for a time. China’s economy is still catching up. Huge 
potential for growth requires capital only for more off-the-shelf technology to produce consumer 
goods, housing, and automobiles of acceptable quality for an expanding middle class. China 
validates the argument of Aghion et al (2006) that catch-up growth demands less of business 
leaders than does the sustained growth of a high-income economy. Passably talented Party cadres 
can import foreign machinery, produce generic goods amid passably restrained corruption, and 
still greatly improve living standards for many years. But ultimately, China will find itself where 
South Korea and other nouveaux riches Asian economies now stand. Off-the-shelf is no longer 
good enough: Korean firms must now produce innovations – technologically superior cars, 
appliances, or electronics – to continue growing. That requires capital for innovators, rewards for 
creativity, a tolerance for disruptive innovation, and acceptance of the destruction of stagnant 
business so their resources can be reallocated to better uses (Acemoglu et al. 2006; Fogel et al. 
2008).  
That the CCP OD might reliably do this raises reservation (Aghion et al. 2006). 
Bureaucracies typically resist innovation and instability (Wilson 1989), yet accommodating both 
seems the essential element behind capitalism’s sustained success (Schumpeter 1911). Can 
Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics do this too? Or must China’s leaders decide 
between sustained economic growth and preserving the Party’s leading role? 
Several chapters – Allen and Shen (2012, this volume), Allen et al. (2012, this volume), 
and Piotroski and Wong (2012, this volume) – see this binary choice approaching. Allen et al. 
argue that, if China’s leaders desire a permanent place for their country amid the ranks of 
developed economies, they would best consider embracing capitalism fully. They argue that 
more efficient capital allocation can be achieved if China privatizes its large banks so as to 
render their lending decisions meaningfully independent of government policy. They add full-
fledged bankruptcy reform as an essential complement to bank privatization because even 
thoroughly independently run banks’ lending decisions will accord with officials’ preferences, 
rather than economic fundamentals, if government and Party officials continue determining 
whether or not, and how severely, the bankruptcy code is to be applied on a case-by-case basis. 
They echo Allen and Shen (2012, this volume) and Piotroski and Wong (2012, this volume) in 
concluding that China’s stock markets remain incapable of allocating capital efficiently, and 
perceive this deficiency important even if banks are privatized because bank financing is less 
agile than stock market at capitalizing new industries. 20 
 
Many in China’s media and leadership seemingly concur, calling for “deeper structural 
reform”. The chapters argue that this is the simpler path because it is a well-trodden. Liberal 
economics and democratic politics are far from perfect: their stock markets and banking systems 
undergo occasional manias and panics, and their politics can go badly awry. But they are the 
only proven path to high living standards sustained over the long run (Fukuyama 1992).  
Stock markets allocate capital by raising and lowering firms’ share prices. Higher share 
prices, all else equal, let firms raise capital more cheaply (Tobin 1984). If a stock market is to 
allocate capital efficiently, investors must have access to low cost information about firms whose 
shares they must value (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Wurgler 2000). China’s disclosure regime 
looks sophisticated, but Piotroski and Wong (2012, this volume) argue that actually leaves listed 
firms profoundly opaque because politics prevents uniform adherence to disclosure rules and 
consistent penalization for their violations. If stock markets are to promote prosperity, 
shareholders must peer into firms so they can put their money into ventures they deem profitable. 
Different firms’ top managers provide different choices to shareholders in developed capitalist 
economies by devising unique, creative, and idiosyncratic strategies, products, and policies. If 
China’s leaders desire more efficient capital allocation, they might loosen Party over corporate 
decision-making so individual firms can pursue genuinely new and different paths that 
shareholders can genuinely evaluate, and either endorse or spurn. 
A thoroughgoing conversion to free markets is only one possible option. Moreover, as 
Allen and Shen (2012, this volume) stress, such a conversion would have to be epiphanic. The 
Party would have to cede the economy’s Commanding Heights, entrusting the allocation of 
capital, labour, and other resources to market forces, delegating the rule of law to an independent 
and impartial judiciary, and authorizing regulatory powers to an independent civil service. Even 
such basic concepts as a CCP OD promoting people through top positions in banks, companies, 
regulatory agencies, and governments would be at risk, relegating managers’ careers to a market 
for talent.  
Is acquiescence to capitalism only a matter of time? Looking forwards, even if SOE 
banks are not privatized, Allen et al. foresee foreign banks and credit cooperatives as a 
potentially impartial source of loans to the hybrid sector. They also argue that China’s growth 
might be furthered by US-style private equity and venture capital funds, also capable of 
capitalizing that sector. But none of their suggestions seem feasible as incremental adaptations 
within the current framework of Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. For example, 
the rule that any business with more than three employees who are Party members must accept a 
Party Cell would surely apply to venture capital or private equity financed firms. Venture capital 
and private equity fund would presumably also benefit from Party Secretaries, Party Committees, 
and Party cells. Foreign banks, for example, must accept Party Cells and heed advice from Party 
cadres. Fully privatized banks would still have Party Committees and party Secretaries, and the 
Party cannot presume to retain the economy’s Commanding Heights without retaining control 
over the judiciary.  
A more likely scenario, in the view of most authors in this volume, is that China will 
persist in forging its own path towards sustainable prosperity under the continuing guidance of 
the Party. Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has delivered – so far. But Hayek’s 
(1941, 1945) essential critique of socialism stands unrefuted: information and coordination costs 
rise faster with scale and complexity in a command and control economy than in a market 
economy.  21 
 
Pistor (2012, this volume) describes a broader range of capitalisms than most 
Anglophone economists usually consider. For example, postwar France achieved three decades 
of dramatic recovery while scorning Anglo-Saxon naïvety about market forces. The French did 
almost everything “wrong”. They entrusted the governance of large business enterprises to ex-
civil servants, corporate investment decisions to industry-level ministry personnel, and corporate 
finance to SOE banks. While the system now shows growing strain – high youth and minority 
unemployment, aging capital assets, entitled public sector unions, and so on (Smith 2004) – 
France sustains a high per capita GDP and an enviable quality of life. Were China to attain 
similar success from a like system, much of her populace would celebrate.  
But is this feasible? Postwar France was an open economy, a founding member of the 
precursor to today’s European Union. Regulations, politicized approval processes, and the 
omnipresent helpful supervision of Party Cells and Party Secretaries perhaps allow the Chinese 
government latitude for poor policy that European integration denied France. Postwar France 
also had competitive democratic governments, with rival parties vocally criticizing each others’ 
policies despite sharing a common corporatist vision, and a free press that enthusiastically 
skewered sufficiently egregious corruption, waste, or fraud. Though China now allows contested 
elections at the lowest levels of municipal government and tolerates a degree of media dissent 
unthinkable under Mao, it remains a one-party state with a controlled press. The postwar French 
civil service was a genuine meritocracy: entry depended only on academic evaluation, and 
success depended on performance. China seems intent on something along these lines too, but 
Party loyalty still counts for much.  
Allen et al. (2012, this volume) argue that other Chinese characteristics of China’s 
institutional syncretism – Confucian behavioural norms, traditional dispute resolution, and 
cultural standards lauding family and reputation – also help explain China’s success, and often 
substitute effectively for formal legal codes and regulations. However, this constrains economic 
activity to channels in which these traditional mechanisms operate, enhancing the importance of 
connections and kinship.  
If aging Communist leaders increasingly overtly favour their “princeling” sons, a 
meritocracy may become unsustainable. China’s leadership appears to appreciate problems 
arising from Party “princelings” disgracing their stalwart parents, but business princelings 
growing to resemble pre-liberation bourgeois and aristocrats is a more difficult problem. If China 
develops fully in a single generation, as South Korea did, entrenched princelings might matter 
little. But Korea ultimately embraced the full complement of free market institutions, which 
China thus far declines. If China’s heretofore successful economic trailblazing ultimately takes 
longer, unqualified business princelings could become an entrenched oligarchy more reminiscent 
of Latin America than of France or South Korea.  
The end of the Cold War and the failure of third world Middle Ways, such as Latin 
American corporatism and India’s License Raj, leaves variants of free market economics the 
only off-the-shelf choices on offer (Fukuyama 2011). Even the US financial crisis of 2008, 
despite evoking voluble calls for better regulation, inspires no visionary new alternatives to 
capitalism. Even France, hailing European integration and driven by fiscal necessity, is slowly 
shedding its postwar system. Pragmatism may well push China towards more genuine free 
market economics, and recognition of the information problems inherent in centralized 
bureaucratic control may well render Market Socialism’s characteristics progressively less 
Chinese.  22 
 
Institutional change often requires a crisis to dislodged entrenched interest groups (Olson 
2000), so Allen et al. (2012, this volume; see also Allen and Gale 2004, 2007) may well correctly 
foresee successive internal crisis reforming and strengthening Chinese institutions. In this 
context, Xu’s (2012, this volume) discussion of this chapter, which highlights China’s relative 
immunity to both the 1997 and 2008 financial crises, may bode ill for China’s long-term 
prosperity. Xu argues that a guarded embrace of capitalism might be warranted for stability’s 
sake. But Olson (2000) argues that efforts to promote stability often inhibit efficient resource 
allocation, and thus has costs. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate that China’s mean firm-level 
total factor productivity would have grown 2% faster every year were Chinese firms relocated to 
the United States.  
Nonetheless, a common denominator throughout the chapters in this volume is the 
overarching public policy objective of safeguarding uncontestable Party control over the 
commanding heights of the Chinese economy. The chapters in this volume caution that a range 
of increasingly serious economic inefficiencies are likely if the Party assigns an overarching 
value to the persistent stability of the current regulatory system. Alternative approaches to 
regulation merit consideration if the Party wishes to enhance the economic efficiency of financial 
markets (Alen and Shen, 2012, this volume; Allen et al.,2012, this volume), the banking system 
(Allen et al., 2012, this volume), information intermediation (Piotroski and Wong, 2012, this 
volume), public goods provision (Chen, 2012, this volume), corporate governance (Pistor, 2012, 
this volume), labor allocation (Gordon and Li, 2012, this volume), and risk-taking (Alen and 
Shen, 2012, this volume; Allen et al.,2012, this volume; Bayoumi et al., 2012, this volume; 
Young et al., 2012, this volume).   
The chapters of this volume also largely concur that Market Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics is a surprisingly unique and innovative economic system that has achieved 
spectacular results. But a second common theme we distill from the chapters as a whole is the 
system’s continuation risks increasingly inefficient resource allocation, rising social problems, 
and magnified instability in the impending future. Different chapters assess the pros and cons of 
different policy options, but a common theme emerges throughout: If China’s leaders aspire to 
guide their country into ranks of high income economies, looking beyond Market Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics appears inevitable. The most straightforward option is convergence 
towards the proven, albeit intermittently fallible, genuinely market-driven systems of the 
advanced industrial democracies. But another possibility is that, bolstered by the past decades’ 
successes, China will continue forging a unique path forward. Having embraced Deng 
Xiaoping’s call to “let a few people get rich first,” China’s next step is genuinely inscrutable.  
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